Re: ``New World Order in Chaos''
David Bright's ambitiously-titled editorial in April 17's Fast Forward focuses far too narrowly, given the questions being asked.
At stake is not merely the government of Iraq (and Afghanistan, let's not forget) but the resurrection of an old diplomatic technique: imperialism.
New World Order Imperialism
Nuclear Weapons
From some of the earliest days of the Bush II Administration signs of unilateral behaviour were evident with their dealings regarding nuclear arms.
In August, 2001, Bush announced the American intension to withdraw from the landmark Antiballistic Missile Treaty. [1] [2] Pulling out of this treaty — as the US formally did in December of 2001 [3] — was widely called a nullification of 30 years of nuclear disarmament and was roundly criticised by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who called the move, ``a mistake''.
[1] -- Wikipedia definition: <www.wikipedia.org>
[2] -- A Google cache of a New York Times article about this exists: <216.239.53.100>
The next month — in January of 2002 — Donald Rumsfeld presented the new American Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) [4] [5] to the Pentagon. [6] The document was subsequently partially leaked to the media in March, 2002. [7]
[4] -- A backgrounder on the NPR from the Union of Concerned Scientists is available: <www.ucsusa.org>
[5] -- Excerpts from the report: <www.globalsecurity.org>
[6] -- Excerpts and pieces of the Nuclear Posture Review and slides from the Department of Defense breifing: <cryptome.org>
[7] -- By the Los Angeles Times: <www.latimes.com>
In his presentation, Rumsfeld recommended reducing the actively-deployed fleet of US nuclear warheads to around two thousand. Amid much fanfare in May, 2002 — a month before the American obligations to the ABM Treaty would expire — Bush managed to get Putin to "agree" to reduce the American and Russian actively-deployed fleet of nuclear weapons...to around 2000. [8]
[8] -- See my related article: <mike-warren.com>
The treaty had no provisions for destruction of warheads and no real schedule for implementation. In other words it was, ``what [the US] wanted to do anyway'' according to an unnamed Administration official. [9] That is, it was a public-relations campaign.
[9] -- As quoted by TomPaine.com
The US Administration is now in the process of restarting its nuclear development and manufacturing systems [10] with a $320 million budget for the next fiscal year. This program will include designing a plant to construct up to 500 "pits" (the spheres of plutonium and uranium in the centre of warheads) per year.
[10] -- <sfgate.com>
Military Action
To look propertly at American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, one must first read (at least) two important documents: the Bush Administration's revised Foreign Policy and the documents of The Project for the New American Century.
The former is outlined partially in The National Security Strategy of the United States [11] , released on the one-year anniversary of the September, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by the National Security Council [12] . The latter [13] — although not official American policy — is the result of work by many influential members of the Bush administration, including Richard Pearle (since resigned), Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, among others.
[13] -- Online at: <www.newamericancentury.org>
The National Security Strategy
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a thirty-page treatise which — in hindsight at least — outlines actions of the American government: preemptive strikes, unilateral action, economic pressure and the prevailing view that America and America alone is right. Or, as the paper puts it, ``The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. ... the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people every- where.''
In other words, American ideas about justice and liberty are what everyone should want. If they don't, America will invade them. Or, couched in the terms of the document, ``We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;'' (Much of the Strategy talks about ``terrorists'').
The NSS is also one of the first hints at a buzzword which will be uttered a lot this year: ``Coalitions of the willing can augment ... permanent institutions [like the UN, NATO, WTO].''
The arrogant words of the NSS make one thing clear: the US is willing to act by itself [14] if it — and it alone — thinks something isn't Right with the world. A binary view of the world (``...you're either with us or against us...'', ``Freedom and fear are at war...'', etcetera) prevails throughout the document and indeed many of the speeches from the Administration.
[14] -- For example, again quoting the NSS, ``Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism.'' The key words being, ``whenever possible'' implying that such organisations will be used only when they are compatible with American interests.
The Project for the New American Century
The Project for the New American Century is far less subtle; in their Statement of Principles, for example, they say, ``We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.''
It doesn't get much plainer than that, yet claims that the US is now engaged in exactly that course of action are often met with incredulity and scoffs of ``conspiracy theory''. The Statement of Principles goes on:
``Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world.''
``[America] cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.''
On Iraq, the Project for the New American Century was rattling the war sabres way back in 1998, writing to then-President Bill Clinton, ``In the near term, [dependence on cooperation from "coalition partners" and Hussein] means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.''
The same letter advocates that such action should be unilateral if need be: ``American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.''
The Project for the New American Century unabashedly demands that the United States become a world ``constabulary'' force and screw everyone else.
Onward: Afghanistan
Reading these official and semi-official statements of principles, it's hardly surprising, then, that the US would invade Middle Eastern countries. Looking back at Afghanistan now, it could be seen as a ``water-testing'' type of operation; a tentative first step into the foreign-policy objectives boldly outlined.
With little evidence (indeed, I've not seen any) linking bin Laden to the 2001 WTC attacks, Bush started demanding that the Afghani leadership hand over bin Laden dead or alive a mere six days after the attacks. Can an exhaustive international investigation take place over the course of less than a week? Of note also is that Bush invoked NATO's Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to claim that they were being invaded and needed immediate NATO assistance in eliminating the threat on September 12, 2001 — the day after the attacks. This supposed threat of imminent attack would later be used as partial justification for invasion.
In any case — bin Laden guilty or not — ``regime change'' [15] in Afghanistan became a de facto reason for invading and was increasingly used as military-action justification by both the Administration and pundits alike.
[15] -- The Christian Science Monitor provides an illuminating timeline of the success of past US regime changes: <www.csmonitor.com>
Indeed, the template for both Afghanistan and Iraq looks similar: circumvent the United Nations, build up a ``coalition'' [16] of countries, bluster up some pretext and roll in with the tanks. Afghanistan can really be viewed in all senses as an Iraq-type operation writ small: a horribly repressive regime (arguably Afghanistan was worse than Iraq) against which it is mighty easy to drum up ``regime-change''-type support and a flimsy international-law based case.
[16] -- Quotes indicate the verbicide perpetrated on that word by the Iraq "coalition"; see <mike-warren.com> for more.
In Afghanistan this ``case'' was that bin Laden — accused (but by no means proven) perpetrator of the WTC attacks — was hiding out in Afghanistan, commingled with other sundry reasons: repressive regime, self-defense, terrorist network base. Of course, no formal justice-type proceeding concluded any of this (the US refuses to participate in the International Criminal Court) and few have seen the supposed evidence linking bin Laden to the hi-jackings.
In Iraq, the ``case'' was that an ancient Security Council resolution (678) authorised the US to take unilateral action against Iraq, essentially. Additional pretext was drummed up via the more recent and oft-mentioned Resolution 1441.
Why Iraq?
Of course, tacked-on to the official reason were other reasons (that is, the reasons generally presented in mass media): there are Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq [17] , Saddam Hussein is an Evil Dictator, Iraq is a threat to its neighbours, etcetera.
[17] -- This is looking less and less likely as US Army teams scour the country and refuse to let either the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) weapons inspectors into the country to continue their job.
Critics generally claim that the war was about control of oil reserves, geopolitical strategy in the area and around the world, politicking in front of Presidential elections, lucratively lining pockets of defence contractors and "rebuilding" pay-outs, control of water reserves, etcetera.
People often ask me what I think is the ``reason'' the US was pushing so hard for military action against Iraq. I don't know; I don't have (and can't get) enough information. I suspect, however, that all of the above reasons are correct, to greater and lesser degrees; decisions in giant bureaucracies like the American government are the result of the complex interactions between the various factions and internal power-divisions. For example, I'm sure that many members of the government were convinced that attacking Iraq was a good idea largely because Hussein was a brutal dictator. Others (in larger and smaller number) were likely convinced by one or more of the other reasons.
That said, I think the war — and the reason the US Presidency was pushing so hard for it — was more political than anything; buoyed by the success of Afghanistan (as in: not very much opposition, politically) and given recently-stated American foreign policy objectives, Iraq was a prime opportunity to realise a new power structure in the world: one without a role (or at least a with a very diminished role) for the multilateral structure of the United Nations. [18] Instead, an ad hoc system of ``as-needed'' alliances is installed. Given that the US is far and away the single most powerful nation on Earth (whether we're talking economically, politically or militarily) such an arrangement is infinitely preferable to the US than a system whereby they can be vetoed by vastly less powerful nations.
[18] -- As in : ``coalition of the willing'', a phrase first floated in the National Security Strategy and used with increasing regularity as the buildup to war progressed.
Based on previous history, the US abhors working within multilateral systems like the United Nations unless the situation is clearly advantageous to the US. Their contempt for such institutions was made explicitly clear in the National Security Strategy as I hinted at above with the ``coalition of the willing'' quotation.
Given these goals, Iraq and Afghanistan make prime military targets because they muddy and confuse this very issue. No matter your stance on unilateral (as opposed to multilateral) action, there are pretty good arguments that Hussein's Ba'ath Party and the Taliban were horribly oppressive and brutal regimes. Hence, a lot of public debate was spent arguing against the straw men of the Evil Dictator Regimes. I call this a straw man because the heart of the matter is not the what (depose brutal regimes) but the how (via non-multilateral decision-making). If the world is ready to go on a campaign of democratisation [19] , then the proper way to go about such a thing would be to build true world consensus and carefully plan the best way to promote long-term democratic situations. Means matter just as much as ends.
[19] -- I should note that I don't think there's any way that bombing can install democracy, as amply evidenced by the US' past attempts.
(Please, at this point, read my related essay ``What is Democracy''.)
Iraq is in many ways an even ``better'' target because of the Weapons of Mass Destruction argument: the US was variously claiming that Iraq was already threatening (or would threaten in the future) the US directly with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons — despite the fact that UNMOVIC weapons inspectors were increasingly showing that Iraq had no such weapons (nor trans-continential delivery systems). Sometimes the US just claimed that Iraq's neighbours would be targets (despite, for example, Isreal's movement of Iraq down their ``threat list'' out of #1 based on UNSCOM weapons inspectors' results). If the American goal was really merely to disarm Iraq, letting further inspections take place would have been the logical low-cost, good-result way to do this. Of course, this wasn't their real reason (as they continually stated, ``regime change'' was more important) and was more a side-effect and convenient argument. In other words, it further muddied the debate about invasion.
But there are good reasons!
``There are good reasons to invade Iraq!'' many people protest.
That's partially true: there are certainly many good reasons why it's easy to agree that removing the Hussein regime is a Good Idea, or why getting rid of various nasty weapons is a Good Idea but these are not necessarily an argument for invasion.
For example, Scott Ritter (a former UNSCOM weapons inspector) makes the case in his ``Six Point Peace Plan'' — a plan which the South African government had apparently [20] gotten Iraq to agree to. This plan would have seen internationally-monitored elections take place within three years, among other things.
[20] -- See <vancouver.indymedia.org>
Borrowing from my What is Democracy essay, ``democracy'' isn't merely the holding of occasional elections; it is the host of ideas we associate with the word such as economic and intellectual freedom (the extent to which we're a functioning democracy I'll leave to the other essay). These ideas and attitudes are not ``installed'' in a country; they must develop. The way to foster their development is what needed (and still needs) to be discussed. So while deposing Hussein might be an appealing idea, the American answer (unilateral US invasion) is wrong. While getting rid of so-called ``weapons of mass destruction'' [21] may be an appealing idea — and Syria has recently proposed making the entire Middle East WMD-free — the US answer (unilateral US invasion) is wrong.
[21] -- ...or as our Prime Minister calls them, ``armaments of massive destruction''
...and so?
That's the overarching point of this essay, of course: the US wasn't ever directly interested in solving the problems it perceived in Iraq; they (the problems) were always excuses or conventient side-effects for the US to do what it wanted to do in Iraq and that was to test out and further entrench its new foreign policy on the world stage. ``Consensus'' appears to be an anathema to the American government.
There are really at least three debates: was the Hussein regime a horribly repressive dictatorship? Is disarmament (of ``weapons of mass destruction'') a good idea? Should nations act unilaterally using any and all power available to them to bring about what they alone perceive as ``right''?
The answers are: yes, yes and no, respectively. Unfortunately, many of the debates on these issues tend to lump all these (and more) questions into one giant morass of circular argument. Sometimes — as in the case of Fast Forward Viewport author David Bright — minor details of the situation are discussed. Of course, these details are sometimes interesting but it is unfortunate that Bright's article did not seem to match the title he gave it.
The current US administration is ushering in a new era of unilateral, non-consensus-based action (military, economic and political) based on ``balance-of-power''-type arguments and theory.[22] They have a stated goal of becoming the world power and are now going about that very goal.
[22] -- As an interesting aside, the US just restarted their production facilities for nuclear weapons for the first time in 15 years.
These ideas should be debated but unfortunately seem to be forgotten about as we tend to bog down into details and side-arguments.